The Golden Land
In the 19th century, Britain colonized Burma in chunks, grabbing the lower parts in wars in 1824–26 and 1852–53. But it was not until 1886 that they consolidated control over the entire land.
By the close of World War II, ...
In the 19th century, Britain colonized Burma in chunks, grabbing the lower parts in wars in 1824–26 and 1852–53. But it was not until 1886 that they consolidated control over the entire land.
By the close of World War II, ...
imperialism had run its course. In an effort to effect a peaceful transfer of power in Burma, a constitution was created – one with an important safety valve. In order to reach agreement, major minorities (such as the Karen, Kachin, Shan, etc. that together made up close to 50% of the population) would have the right of succession in ten years, should they feel the need.
To fight a war, you need guns. And to buy guns, you need money.
In these mountains, the only money is opium.
Throughout the 1950's, Burma was wracked by instability, not the least of which involved the two KMT divisions in the north, heavily supported by the CIA. For Washington's cold warriors, destabilization of a country like Burma was of minor importance when compared with potential havoc to communist China.
Armed, fed and paid by the CIA, Washington's plan called for KMT troops in Burma to make cross-border raids into China, where the population would unite with them and drive out the godless commies. But like the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco a decade later, Mao's army easily repelled the KMT's brief forays. Thus it was not long before the KMT turned to what they and their leaders had been doing for decades – running opium and heroin.
Such was the destabilizing effect of these two KMT divisions, that the Red Chinese did indeed eventually invade Burma. But they did so not for a territorial grab, but at the behest of the Burmese, who were by this time sick and tired of this CIA-sponsored army on its territory. This forced the KMT into northern Thailand, where they continued to receive CIA support, all the while expanding their control over the heroin trade. By the early 1970's, the KMT were said to control 80% of the lucrative Golden Triangle drug trade.
Washy washy
Money laundering is another factor in the relationship between the narcotic and precious-stone trades. Even those of us with decades in this business know how difficult it can be to place a value on a gem. When that stone is in its raw form, multiply the difficulty a hundred-fold. A single valuable piece can make or break a mining operation.
Those in the narcotics business face a different problem. Their goods have both a specific market price and high demand, bringing in barrels of cash, but they must find a way to turn those profits into legal income. What better way than to invest in a gem mine – a cash-and-carry business if ever there was – where a quick appearance of funds can easily be put down to the discovery of a new pocket or even a single stone. And so this is what is done, particularly at the jade mines in Burma's Kachin State. Narcotics traders don't mind sinking huge sums of money into losing ventures, because the money that comes out is now clean, and can be re-invested or banked without fear.
All of this is done with the wink and nod of various bankers and government officials, who, with palm extended, turn bad money into good. The involvement of some of SE Asia's largest banks and trading houses in such activities is fairly well documented (see Seagrave, 1995; Booth, 1999). It is a business that knows no political enemies, a trade where religion, race and politics are immaterial. Such laundry services often find heroin dealers queued next to Mafia dons, beside intelligence agents from the CIA and Mossad, along with terrorists and a plethora of others from the dark side.
The needs of the underworld are obvious. In the case of intelligence agencies, the motive may superficially be less obvious, but dig a bit below the surface and you find similar needs. While ideology might occasionally be involved, all too often it is simply a case of playing power. Money means influence; thus it is something to be collected and used. When funding for black ops is difficult to find in Congress or, more often, when simple greed and lust for power overreaches moral precepts, they visit the underground private sector – both to raise money and later hide its origin.
Smuggling of drugs, arms and gems are all involved. The 1980's savings-and-loan scandal in America was a particularly gruesome example of an intelligence agency money-raising operation gone wrong (Stich, 1998), as was the Nugan Hand bank scandal in Australia (Kwitny, 1987). But the whopper of all intelligence money-raising ops had to be CIA involvement in the importation of cocaine into America during the 1980's (à la Iran-Contra) (Webb, 1998; Parry, 1999).
http://www.ruby-sapphire.com/burmese_politics.htm
See MoreTo fight a war, you need guns. And to buy guns, you need money.
In these mountains, the only money is opium.
Throughout the 1950's, Burma was wracked by instability, not the least of which involved the two KMT divisions in the north, heavily supported by the CIA. For Washington's cold warriors, destabilization of a country like Burma was of minor importance when compared with potential havoc to communist China.
Armed, fed and paid by the CIA, Washington's plan called for KMT troops in Burma to make cross-border raids into China, where the population would unite with them and drive out the godless commies. But like the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco a decade later, Mao's army easily repelled the KMT's brief forays. Thus it was not long before the KMT turned to what they and their leaders had been doing for decades – running opium and heroin.
Such was the destabilizing effect of these two KMT divisions, that the Red Chinese did indeed eventually invade Burma. But they did so not for a territorial grab, but at the behest of the Burmese, who were by this time sick and tired of this CIA-sponsored army on its territory. This forced the KMT into northern Thailand, where they continued to receive CIA support, all the while expanding their control over the heroin trade. By the early 1970's, the KMT were said to control 80% of the lucrative Golden Triangle drug trade.
Washy washy
Money laundering is another factor in the relationship between the narcotic and precious-stone trades. Even those of us with decades in this business know how difficult it can be to place a value on a gem. When that stone is in its raw form, multiply the difficulty a hundred-fold. A single valuable piece can make or break a mining operation.
Those in the narcotics business face a different problem. Their goods have both a specific market price and high demand, bringing in barrels of cash, but they must find a way to turn those profits into legal income. What better way than to invest in a gem mine – a cash-and-carry business if ever there was – where a quick appearance of funds can easily be put down to the discovery of a new pocket or even a single stone. And so this is what is done, particularly at the jade mines in Burma's Kachin State. Narcotics traders don't mind sinking huge sums of money into losing ventures, because the money that comes out is now clean, and can be re-invested or banked without fear.
All of this is done with the wink and nod of various bankers and government officials, who, with palm extended, turn bad money into good. The involvement of some of SE Asia's largest banks and trading houses in such activities is fairly well documented (see Seagrave, 1995; Booth, 1999). It is a business that knows no political enemies, a trade where religion, race and politics are immaterial. Such laundry services often find heroin dealers queued next to Mafia dons, beside intelligence agents from the CIA and Mossad, along with terrorists and a plethora of others from the dark side.
The needs of the underworld are obvious. In the case of intelligence agencies, the motive may superficially be less obvious, but dig a bit below the surface and you find similar needs. While ideology might occasionally be involved, all too often it is simply a case of playing power. Money means influence; thus it is something to be collected and used. When funding for black ops is difficult to find in Congress or, more often, when simple greed and lust for power overreaches moral precepts, they visit the underground private sector – both to raise money and later hide its origin.
Smuggling of drugs, arms and gems are all involved. The 1980's savings-and-loan scandal in America was a particularly gruesome example of an intelligence agency money-raising operation gone wrong (Stich, 1998), as was the Nugan Hand bank scandal in Australia (Kwitny, 1987). But the whopper of all intelligence money-raising ops had to be CIA involvement in the importation of cocaine into America during the 1980's (à la Iran-Contra) (Webb, 1998; Parry, 1999).
http://www.ruby-sapphire.com/burmese_politics.htm
No comments:
Post a Comment